Handguns as Products Unreasonably Dangerous Per Se by McClurg, Andrew Jay
University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review 
Volume 13 Issue 4 Article 1 
1990 
Handguns as Products Unreasonably Dangerous Per Se 
Andrew Jay McClurg 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Andrew Jay McClurg, Handguns as Products Unreasonably Dangerous Per Se, 13 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. 
REV. 599 (1991). 
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/vol13/iss4/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review by an authorized editor of Bowen 
Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu. 
UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS AT LITTLE ROCK
LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME 13 SUMMER 1991 NUMBER 4
HANDGUNS AS PRODUCTS UNREASONABLY
DANGEROUS PER SE
Andrew Jay McClurg*
"Thank God for President Reagan, a man who, even after being shot,
realizes that more gun controls are not the solution to our crime prob-
lem .... Here's a man of guts, common sense and vision. May he live
to be 120."
J. Anderson, Guns In American Life 7 (1984) (quoting a
tribute to the former President appearing in a gun magazine
following the Hinckley assassination attempt).
"[I] want you to know something . . .and I'm going to state it in
clear, unmistakable language. I support the Brady Bill and I urge the
Congress-to enact it .... [I]t's just plain common sense that there be
a waiting period to allow local law enforcement officials to conduct
background checks on those who wish to buy a handgun."
Address by Ronald Reagan, George Washington University
(Mar. 28, 1991).
* Associate Professor, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law. B.S., J.D.,
University of Florida. I would like to thank Jane Bishkin for her help researching this article and
Professor Glenn E. Pasvogel for reading and commenting upon a draft of the article. I am also
grateful to the outstanding staff of the UALR law library for their valuable assistance on this and
other articles I have written.
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INTRODUCTION: HANDGUN VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL POLICY
Narrowly, this written debate between Professor Oliver and me1
concerns tort law, not gun control. The issue we will be disagreeing
about is whether handgun manufacturers should be held strictly liable
when one of their products is used to kill or injure someone. However,
there is no denying that the success of my argument in favor of such
liability hinges upon public policy. Consequently, some initial words
about policy are appropriate.
I have always shunned the word "rethinking," that favorite expres-
sion employed by legal scholars to describe what they do when they
write about a subject that has already been written about extensively
by others. However, President Reagan's stunning reversal in position
tempted me to use it here. Mr. Reagan's endorsement of the Brady
Bill,2 which would impose a national waiting period and background
checks for handgun purchases, is nothing less than remarkable. Presi-
dent Reagan was the first candidate for president ever endorsed by the
National Rifle Association and has long been a staunch supporter of
the unrestricted right of American citizens to own as many guns as
they choose.
Perhaps, I thought, President Reagan's support for the Brady Bill
is an omen that we finally are ready to begin "rethinking" this coun-
try's insane gun policies. Then, as I was strapping on my rethinking
cap, I was saved by the realization that one cannot rethink what has
never been seriously thought about. There has been too little serious
thought or discussion about either the reasons for or the consequences
of this nation's gun policies.' Intimidated by the N.R.A., enchanted
I. Professor Oliver's response will appear in a future issue, along with my reply to his re-
sponse. It is my hope that this faculty forum will become an annual feature in the UALR Law
Journal. One of our greatest assets is the diversity of our faculty and we should take advantage of
it. I see the faculty forum serving as a provocative, intellectual showcase of competing views upon
major issues of the day in a more informal, less traditional law journal format.
2. Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, S. 257; H.R. 7, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
3. There are a handful of works, most of them written by students, addressing the issue of
strict liability for gun manufacturers. Turley, Manufacturers' and Suppliers' Liability to Hand-
gun Victims, 10 N. Ky. L. REV. 41 (1982); Note, The Manufacture and Distribution of Hand-
guns As an Abnormally Dangerous Activity, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 369 (1987); Note, Handguns and
Products Liability, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1912 (1984); Note, A Shot At Strict Controls: Strict Lia-
bility for Gun Manufacturers, 15 PAC. L.J. 171 (1983); Note, Manufacturers' Strict Liability for
Injuries From A Well-Made Handgun, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 467 (1983); Case Note, Mary-
land Holds Manufacturer of "Saturday Night Specials" Strictly Liable for Injuries Suffered by
Innocent Victims of Criminal Handgun Violence, 20 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1147 (1986).
The second amendment, the constitutional source of the right to keep and bear arms, has
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with the rich and romantic history of guns in America and bamboozled
by an absolutist interpretation of the second amendment,4 most of us
have simply accepted that there should be little or no legal regulation
of this most dangerous of products.
Americans are becoming desensitized to violence and I fear this
colors all debate about handguns. Every day we read horror stories of
sleeping children killed by random bullets flying through walls or other
innocents gunned down while standing on street corners, yet we do lit-
tle more than shake our heads and mutter "how awful." This desensiti-
zation is not particularly surprising. By age eighteen, the average
American child will have watched more than 200,000 violent acts on
television, 40,000 of them murders.' The violence saturation process
starts early with Looney Tune cartoons where Elmer Fudd and Bugs
Bunny take turns blowing each other's head off with a shotgun. I feel
like a liar telling my five-year-old that it is all just pretend, knowing
that while she is watching the cartoon there is a good chance someone
received little attention from legal scholars. In "The Embarassing Second Amendment," Professor
Sanford Levinson notes that only one law journal article regarding the amendment (not including
his) has ever appeared in an "elite" law review. Levinson, The Embarassing Second Amendment,
99 YALE L.J. 637, 639 n.13 (1989). The amendment is mentioned in leading constitutional law
casebooks only in the text of the constitution reprinted in the casebooks. Id. at 639 n.14. Constitu-
tional law treatises give the amendment only minimal treatment. Id. at 640.
4. The second amendment provides: "A well regulated Militia being necessary to the secur-
ity of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed." U.S.
CONST. amend. II. The debate regarding the proper interpretation of the second amendment is
unresolved. One view is that the preamble sets out the purpose of the amendment, so as to restrict
the right to keep and bear arms to that necessary to maintain a well regulated state militia.
Levinson, supra note 3, at 644. This interpretation precludes recognition of any individual right to
keep and bear arms. Id. Professor Levinson's article, however, makes a case for a stronger inter-
pretation of the second amendment which would protect the individual's right to own guns for
self-protection. In any event, the second amendment is not implicated by the proposal for state-
imposed strict liability against handgun manufacturers because it has never been incorporated into
the fourteenth amendment due process clause and made binding against the states. Presser v.
Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886) (holding that the second amendment declaration that the right
to bear arms shall not be infringed "means no more than that it shall not be infringed by Con-
gress. This is one of the amendments that has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the
National Government .... "). Professor Levinson points out that Presser was decided before any
of the amendments in the Bill of Rights were incorporated and, therefore, we cannot know
whether the Presser court was singling out the second amendment or would have reached the
same conclusion with regard to any amendment. Id. at 653. However, a federal court of appeals
has rejected this construction of Presser. Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 269-70
(7th Cir. 1982) ("we hold that the second amendment does not apply to the states").
5. Violence in Our Culture, NEWSWEEK, Apr. I, 1991, at 51 (citing Thomas Radecki, re-
search director for the National Coalition on Television Violence).
602 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:599
is being murdered with a handgun.6 Trying to hide the truth about gun
violence from children seems futile anyway, as more and more children
experience it first hand in school and on the streets.7
Statistics regarding handgun violence in America are so staggering
that they tend to numb the mind. In trying to think of a way to convey
the actual horror of 22,000 Americans killed by handguns each year,8 I
remembered with sympathy how President Reagan used to struggle to
explain the federal deficit in comprehensible terms: "If you lined up a
trillion dollars, they would reach all the way to Alpha Centauri and
back, with enough change to take four trips to the moon." (It was
something like that.)
Twenty-two thousand people killed each year. That is more people
than live in most counties in Arkansas. It is twenty-one thousand and
nine-hundred more casualties than the United States lost in combat in
the Persian Gulf war. With 22,000 bullets, we could follow Shake-
speare's advice and kill all the lawyers in the state seven times over,
with plenty of ammunition left over for the expert witnesses. Twenty-
two thousand people is more people than most of us will know in a
lifetime.
Our anesthetized consciousness (and perhaps conscience) to hand-
6. Every day, twenty-five people are murdered with handguns, thirty-three women are raped
at gun point, 575 people are robbed with a gun and 1,116 people are assaulted with a gun. King,
Sarah and James Brady; Target: The Gun Lobby, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Dec. 9, 1990, at 80,
col. 4.
7. There has been a 97 percent increase in youth firearm murders since 1984. In 1988 and
1989, both record years, 3,435 youths under the age of nineteen were murdered with guns. Since
1986, seventy-one persons have been killed at school. Handgun Control Semi-Annual Progress
Report, Jan. 1991, at 6.
8. This includes deaths from criminal attacks, accidents, and suicides. Wilson, The Num-
bers Game; The Data Behind the Policy, Nat'l J., July 21, 1990, at 1796. Though precise statis-
tics are not available, it is estimated that for every firearm fatality there are five nonfatal firearm
injuries. Stokes, Daily Devastation; Faulty Thinking About 'Accidents' is Hurting Us More Than
We Think, Chi. Trib. Oct. 7, 1990 (Sunday Good Health Magazine), at 32 col. 4. Accepting this
estimate means there are more than 100,000 nonfatal handgun injuries each year.
In 1988, the most recent year for which statistics are available, 8,915 people were murdered
with handguns in the United States. King, supra note 6, at 80, col. 4. This figure becomes more
shocking when it is compared with handgun deaths in other Western nations. In the same year,
only seven people were murdered with handguns in Great Britain, eight in Canada, nineteen in
Sweden, and fifty-three in Switzerland. Id. Approximately 1,200 people die in accidental shootings
each year. Wilson, supra.
The majority of handgun deaths are suicides. In 1986, more than 12,000 people committed
suicide with handguns. Id. While the argument has been made that the easy availability of hand-
guns is causally linked to the soaring suicide rate (Turley, supra note 3, at 55-56), I limit my
argument for strict liability to cases of intentional criminal attacks by third persons and accidental
shootings.
HANDGUNS
gun violence may help explain our extremely selective response to
events which get our ire up. If some idiot burns a flag the solution is to
try to amend the Constitution. The answer to court rulings that state-
sanctioned prayer does not belong in public schools is to try to amend
the Constitution. Every year, someone will introduce a proposal in Con-
gress to amend the Constitution to prohibit busing school children to
achieve integration. But dare to suggest that sensible controls be placed
upon handguns and the instant rallying cry becomes: "You can't do
that. It's in the Constitution!"
Perhaps the answer is to run video tape on the evening news of a
convenience store clerk being executed in cold blood. Live coverage is
apparently what it takes to motivate many Americans. It took a hellish
home video to wake us to the nightmare police brutality, even though
several thousand complaints of such brutality are filed each year.9 Ap-
parently, we have to see it to believe it. That probably explains why
every major national law enforcement organization has spoken out in
favor of reasonable gun control measures like the Brady Bill.10 Police
officers see and live the consequences of our skewed gun policies every
day. What will it take to persuade the rest of us that something is
wrong with those policies? At what point will we begin to fairly and
honestly weigh the reality of the societal cost of handgun violence
against the mostly illusory value of handguns to society?
The time has come for courts to impose strict liability upon hand-
gun manufacturers when a well-made 1 handgun is used to inflict death
or injury, either intentionally or accidentally. Professor Oliver may re-
spond by condemning what he sees as a blatant appeal for the courts to
make a major social policy decision which, if it is to be made at all,
should be left to Congress or state legislatures. Support for this view
would be easy to find. The New York Court of Appeals, in describing
9. 1 am referring to the sickening episode earlier this year where four Los Angeles police
officers were captured on video tape kicking and clubbing an unarmed black motorist they had
apprehended after an automobile chase, while a dozen other officers, including their supervisor,
stood by and watched.
10. The following police organizations have voiced support for the Brady Bill: Fraternal
Order of Police (with 217,000 members), National Association of Police Organizations (130,000
members), International Association of Chiefs of Police (15,000 members), National Sheriffs' As-
sociation (22,000 members), and the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Execu-
tives (2,300 members). Just the Facts About the Brady Bill (newsletter of Handgun Control,
Inc.).
I1. This debate does not concern the non-controversial issue of tort liability for injuries
caused by handguns which are defectively manufactured. It focuses only upon liability for injuries
inflicted by handguns which are properly manufactured and perform as intended.
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the role of the judiciary in resolving controversies, once commented: "It
is a rare exercise of judicial power to use a decision in private litigation
as a purposeful mechanism to achieve direct public objectives greatly
beyond the rights and interests before the court."12
Ignoring the questionable accuracy of this pronouncement, 3 using
it to argue against strict liability for handgun manufacturers would be
a case of trying to close the barn door after the horses are out. The
decision to impose strict liability for defective products was a major
policy decision of the purest kind. The principal rationale underlying
strict products liability is that those who manufacture defective prod-
ucts should bear the cost of injuries associated with those products be-
cause they are in the best position to insure against the risk and to
distribute the cost of the risk among society." This rationale, of course,
applies with equal force to handgun manufacturers.
Thus, the argument that courts would be exceeding their judicial
function by imposing strict liability upon handgun manufacturers com-
mits the logical fallacy of ignoratio elenchi - that is, it supports a
different conclusion than the one sought to be proved. Rather than es-
tablish the propriety of discriminating against victims of handguns, the
argument supports only the much broader proposition that courts acted
improperly when they implemented strict liability for other defective
products. That battle, however, has been fought and lost.
More importantly, the argument depends upon a false premise:
that by not imposing strict liability for handgun injuries, courts are not
engaged in policy making. The fact is that current law, which rejects
strict liability for handgun manufacturers, 6 promotes a social policy
12. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 222, 257 N.E.2d 870, 871, 309
N.Y.S.2d 312, 314 (1970).
13. I think Professor Oliver would agree that the word "rare" needs to be replaced by
"common" or "frequent" to make the court's statement accurate, though I suspect he also would
like to modify the sentence with an adverb along the lines of "unfortunately" or "lamentably."
14. In his seminal opinion imposing strict liability in tort for injuries caused by defective
products, Justice Traynor opined that "[tihe purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of
injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put the product on
the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves." Green-
man v. Yuba Power Prod. Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701
(1962). More recently, the California Supreme Court declared that "[t]he paramount policy of
the strict products liability rule remains the spreading throughout society of the cost of compen-
sating otherwise defenseless victims of manufacturing defects." Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d
454, 466, 698 P.2d 116, 123, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213, 220 (1985) (imposing strict liability upon resi-
dential landlords for latent defects in rental property).
15. Only one court has imposed strict liability against a handgun manufacturer. In Kelley v.
R.G. Industries, Inc., 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985), the Court of Appeals of Maryland
[Vol. 13:599
1991] HANDGUNS 605
that protects and cultivates the icon-like worship of guns in this coun-
try. This is borne out by the discussion below, which will demonstrate
that faithful application, of modern tort principles justifies imposing
strict liability against handgun manufacturers.
RISK-UTILITY BALANCING AND THE THEORY OF PRODUCTS
UNREASONABLY DANGEROUS PER SE
The narrow legal issue involved in this debate is whether a well-
made handgun is in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous"
when used for its intended or foreseeable purpose so as to subject the
manufacturer to strict liability under section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.1" Two tests are available for making this determina-
tion: the consumer expectation test and risk-utility balancing.
The consumer expectation test, derived from comment i to Section
held the manufacturer of an inexpensive handgun strictly liable when the gun was used in a
robbery to shoot a store clerk. The court limited its holding to "Saturday Night Specials" (id. at
157-58, 497 A.2d at 1159-60), a label reserved for small, low quality, inexpensive handguns with
little utility other than the perpetration of criminal violence. In imposing strict liability, the court
rejected the risk-utility theory relied upon herein (id. at 138-39, 497 A.2d at 1148-50), choosing
instead to base liability upon the somewhat vague theory that it would not be contrary to the
public policy of the state of Maryland to impose liability. Id. at 144-46, 497 A.2d at 1]52-53. See
generally Case Note, supra note 3.
Every other court to consider the issue has declined to impose liability upon handgun manu-
facturers. See, e.g., Delahanty v. Hinckley, 564 A.2d 758 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Shipman v. Jennings
Firearms, Inc., 791 F.2d 1532 (1I1th Cir. 1986); Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir.
1985); Martin v. Harrington and Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1984); Armijo v. Ex
Cam, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 771 (D.N.M. 1987), affd, 843 F.2d 406 (10th Cir. 1988); Richman v.
Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. La. 1983); Hilberg v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 761
P.2d 236 (Colo. App. 1988); Trespalacios v. Valor Corp. of Fla., 486 So. 2d 649 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1986); Linton v. Smith & Wesson, 127 Ill. App. 3d 676, 469 N.E.2d 339 (1984); Strickland
v. Fowler, 499 So. 2d 199 (La. App. 1986); Richardson v. Holland, 741 S.W.2d 751 (Mo. App.
1987); Diggles v. Horwitz, 765 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. App. 1989); Knott v. Liberty Jewelry and Loan,
Inc., 50 Wash. App. 267, 748 P.2d 661 (1988); Estate of Schilling v. Blount, Inc., 152 Wis. 2d
608, 449 N.W.2d 56 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
16. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965). Section 402A provides as follows:
(I) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (I) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
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402A, holds that a product is unreasonably dangerous if it is dangerous
beyond the extent anticipated by the ordinary consumer.1" Admittedly,
application of this test would compel the conclusion that handguns are
not defective products since their dangers are well-known. However,
precisely because the consumer expectation test is inadequate to ana-
lyze large classes of generic defect cases,18 most courts apply some
form of risk-utility balancing as an alternative to the consumer expec-
tation test.19
As the name implies, risk-utility balancing requires that the risk of
the product be weighed against the utility of the product to determine
whether it is in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous. Underly-
ing this approach is the recognition that all products have some risk
and some utility. 0 If every product which presented a risk of harm
were deemed to be defective, every product would be defective. 1
Therefore, the only way to meaningfully evaluate whether the product
is unreasonably dangerous is to weigh the risk of the product against
the product's usefulness to the user and to society.
Courts recognize two basic kinds of generic product defects: prod-
ucts defective because of inadequate warnings and products defective in
17. "The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contem-
plated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the
community as to its characteristics." Id. at § 402A comment i.
18. The consumer expectation test would result in a finding of no defect in all cases (includ-
ing handgun cases) where the defect was open and obvious. For example, take the case of an
industrial press designed to be activated by a foot pedal rather than a dual-button arrangement
which would require the worker to remove both hands in order to engage the press. A worker
whose hands were crushed by the press could not recover under the consumer expectation test
because she undoubtedly expected the press would crush her hands if she engaged the foot pedal
while her hands were under the press. The consumer expectation test also does not work in situa-
tions where because of the complexity of the product or the user's inexperience with it, the user
has no expectations regarding its dangerousness.
19. Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 421 Mich. 670, 686, 365 N.W.2d 176, 183 (1984) ("the
overwhelming consensus among courts deciding defective design cases is in the use of some form
of risk-utility analysis, either as an exclusive or alternative ground of liability").
20. Keeton, The Meaning of Defect In Products Liability Law-A Review of Basic Princi-
ples, 45 Mo. L. REV. 579, 592 (1980).
21. In my Torts class, I challenge students to name a product which does not present some
risk of harm. Thus far, they have been unsuccessful. Some popular entries, along with my re-
sponses, include: a nerf ball--could obstruct driver's vision and cause an accident if tossed around
in a moving vehicle; a law book--could cause someone to trip and fall if left on the floor; a roll of
toilet paper--could ignite if stored near a heat source; a postage stamp--could result in choking
or a paper cut. Having progressed halfway through the Prosser casebook so heavily laced with
notes chronicling the amazing capacity of persons to injure themselves, most students accept that




design. Warnings are not an issue in handgun cases because the dan-
gers of handguns are open and obvious. Moreover, though handgun
cases are usually analyzed under a design defect theory, handguns are
not defective in design because, admittedly, there is no safer design
available which would not impair their utility. However, as discussed
below, handguns are defective under the discrete theory of products
unreasonably dangerous per se.
The Prosser hornbook identifies three different reasons for con-
cluding under risk-utility analysis that a product is unreasonably dan-
gerous in design: (1) the intended and reasonably foreseeable risks of
the product outweigh the benefits from the product in terms of wants,
desires, and needs served by the product; (2) although the risks do not
outweigh the benefits, alternative products with the same utility are
available; and (3) although the risks do not outweigh the benefits, there
was a feasible way to design the product more safely without substan-
tially impairing its utility. 2
Of these three categories, only the last one truly relates to design
defects because it is the only one which requires proof that the product
could have been designed more safely without impairing its utility. Un-
less proof is required of a feasible alternative design, it makes little
sense to analyze the problem in terms of a defect in design. Defect in
design connotes that there is a nondefective, safer design available for
the same product which does not impair its utility. To say a product is
designed defectively in the absence of evidence that it could have been
designed in a safer way without substantially impairing its usefulness
or cost utility is really to make a per se determination that the risk of
the product outweighs its utility to society.
Thus, clarity can be added to the risk-utility calculus by reserving
the rubric "design defect" for cases involving products which are defec-
tive because of the existence of a feasible alternative design (the third
category outlined in the Prosser hornbook). Cases where the product is
deemed to be defective under risk-utility balancing without regard to
the existence of feasible alternative designs (the first two categories
listed in Prosser) can be analyzed more profitably by recognizing the
classification of products unreasonably dangerous per se as a distinct
category of product defect.2 3
22. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN. PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 99, 699 (5th ed. 1984) (citing Keeton, Torts. Annual Survey of Texas Law, 35 Sw. L.J.
1 (1981)).
23. See Halphen v. Johns-Mansville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986). In Halphen,
1991]
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A central theme in products liability law is that, as a threshold to
imposing strict liability, there must be "something wrong" with the
product2 Otherwise, the argument goes, all product related injuries
would result in liability to the manufacturer. However, as applied to
handguns and other products which are unreasonably dangerous per se,
this simply begs the question. Under risk-utility balancing, there is
"something wrong" with the product if the risk presented by the prod-
uct outweighs its utility. This conclusion is strengthened where substi-
tute products exist which satisfy the same needs as the unreasonably
dangerous product.
Contrary to argument, this is not the same as saying that all prod-
ucts which cause injury are defective. The examples usually offered in
connection with this argument - e.g., automobiles, knives, matches -
are not defective because their utility outweighs their risk. To put
handguns on a par with these products in terms of their respective util-
ity to society is ludicrous. A day rarely passes where I do not use an
automobile, knife, or match, but, at age thirty-six, I have yet to find
need for a handgun. Automobiles, knives, and matches have substantial
utility apart from causing harm. Handguns do not. Were it declared
that beginning at sunrise tomorrow we could not use our automobiles,
knives, or matches, society would be paralyzed. On the other hand,
were it declared that handguns could no longer be used, society would
continue to function with little disruption.2 5
the court recognized products which are unreasonably dangerous per se as a separate category of
defective products and held that manufacturers of such products are strictly liable even if the risk
of the product was not foreseeable. Id. at 113-14. This latter issue-whether knowledge of a risk
for purposes of risk-utility balancing should be imputed to the manufacturer regardless of whether
the manufacturer knew or should have known of the risk- is what distinguishes true strict liabil-
ity from negligence precepts. It is not an issue with respect to handguns since the dangers of
handguns are well-known to manufacturers.
A Louisiana appellate court has rejected application of the Halphen unreasonably dangerous
per se classification to both handguns and assault rifles. Strickland v. Fowler, 499 So. 2d 199 (La.
Ct. App. 1986) (handguns); Addison v. Williams, 546 So. 2d 220 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (assault
rifle). The court held in Addison that a product "cannot be said to be unreasonably dangerous per
se where the danger complained of is the purpose and function of the product." 546 So. 2d at 225.
24. See Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 830
(1973) (noting that the drafters of section 402A added the word "defective" to make it clear that
something had to be wrong with the product); see also Note, Handguns and Products Liability.
supra note 3, at 1915-19 (asserting this as a basis for rejecting strict liability against handgun
manufacturers).
25. In a comment to section 402A of the Restatement, the drafters state:
Good whiskey is not unreasonably dangerous merely because it will make some people
drunk, and is especially dangerous to alcoholics; but bad whiskey, containing a danger-
ous amount of fusel oil, is unreasonably dangerous. Good tobacco is not unreasonably
[Vol. 13:599
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Courts indirectly recognize this theory of products as unreasonably
dangerous per se when, in design cases, they impose liability in the
absence of proof regarding a feasible alternative design. O'Brien v.
Muskin Corporation" is illustrative. The plantiff suffered serious inju-
ries as a result of diving into an above-ground swimming pool which
was only four feet deep. He sued the manufacturer alleging the pool
was defective in design because the vinyl liner used by the manufac-
turer was too slippery.27 There was conflicting testimony regarding
whether a feasible alternative design existed for the pool,2 8 but the trial
court refused to allow the issue of design defect to go to the jury.2 9
The New Jersey Supreme Court held the jury should have been
permitted to consider the issue of design defect. Moreover, the court
said that, utilizing a risk-utility analysis, the plaintiff could prove a de-
fect in design without having to prove the existence of an alternative,
safer design. The existence of an alternative design, the court said, is
only one factor to consider. The following passage discussing these is-
sues is enlightening:
The assessment of the utility of a design involves the considera-
tion of available alternatives....
The evaluation of the utility of a product also involves the rela-
dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may be harmful; but tobacco contain-
ing something like marijuana may be unreasonably dangerous. Good butter is not un-
reasonably dangerous merely because, if such be the case, it deposits cholesterol in the
arteries and leads to heart attacks; but bad butter, contaminated with poisonous fish oil,
is unreasonably dangerous.
RESTATEMErT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1965). Courts rely upon this comment to
hold that tobacco products and alcohol are not unreasonably dangerous products, even though
they are both very dangerous. See. e.g., Hite v. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 396 Pa. Super. 82, 578
A.2d 417 (1990) (tobacco); Malek v. Miller Brewing Co., 749 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988)
(alcohol). However, the quoted passage from comment i immediately follows the statement of the
consumer expectation test; thus, the passage must be read with reference to that standard for
evaluating whether a product is unreasonably dangerous. See Hite, 396 Pa. Super. at 91, 578
A.2d at 421 (refusing to recognize defective design theory as to tobacco because Pennsylvania has
not adopted risk-utility balancing in design defect cases). Under pure risk-utility balancing, reas-
sessment of traditional assumptions about alcohol and tobacco may be required.
26. 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298 (1983).
27. Id. at 178, 463 A.2d at 302.
28. The plaintiff presented an expert who testified that wet vinyl is twice as slippery as
rubber latex, which is used to line in-ground pools. The trial court, however, sustained an objec-
tion to this testimony because the expert admitted that he knew of no above-ground pool lined
with a material other than vinyl. Id. at 178, 463 A.2d at 302. Defendant's expert testified that the
slippery quality of vinyl actually made it safer because it allowed the outstretched arms of a diver
to glide, preventing the diver's head from hitting the bottom. Id. at 178-79, 463 A.2d at 303.
29. Id. at 179, 463 A.2d at 303.
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tive need for that product; some products are essentials, while others
are luxuries. A product that fills a critical need and can be designed
in only one way should be viewed differently from a luxury item. Still
other products, including some for which no alternative exists, are so
dangerous and of such little use that under the risk-utility analysis,
a manufacturer would bear the cost of liability of harm to
others ...
A critical issue at trial was whether the design of the pool, call-
ing for a vinyl bottom in a pool four feet deep, was defective. The trial
court should have permitted the jury to consider whether, because of
the dimensions of the pool and slipperiness of the bottom, the risks of
injury so outweighed the utility of the product as to constitute a de-
fect .... [Ilt was not necessary for plaintiff to prove the existence of
alternative, safer designs. Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, even if there are no alternative methods of
making bottoms for above-ground pools, the jury might have found
that the risk posed by the pool outweighed its utility.30
The court discussed the defect alleged in O'Brien in terms of a
defect in design. However, to hold that the jury might find the product
defective regardless of whether an alternative, safer design existed is
tantamount to recognizing the theory of products unreasonably danger-
ous per se - that is, the court authorized the jury to find that the risk
of vinyl-lined above-ground pools simply outweighs their low utility to
society.
Courts act similarly when they impose liability upon manufactur-
ers for failing to warn of obvious dangers. It is a general rule that a
manufacturer has no duty to warn of an obvious danger inhering in a
product.31 But courts often conclude or allow juries to conclude that
product dangers were not obvious in cases where most reasonable peo-
ple would disagree.32 From a narrow, realist perspective, the results in
30. Id. at 184-85; 463 A.2d at 305-06 (emphasis added).
31. Henderson & Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of
Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 280 (1990) (and cases collected therein).
32. See. e.g., Corbin v. Coleco Indus., 748 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1984) (genuine issue of fact
existed as to whether danger of serious spinal cord injury from diving into shallow above-ground
pool was open and obvious); Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 4 Cal. 3d 379, 482 P.2d 681, 93
Cal. Rptr. 769 (1971) (jury might conclude reasonable care required warning that ladder should
not be used on soft ground); Leonard v. Pitstick Dairy Lake & Park, Inc., 202 Ill. App. 3d 817,
560 N.E.2d 467 (1990) (suggesting that owner of commercial swimming beach should have
warned fifteen year-old boy of the danger of diving in shallow water); Strain v. Mitchell Mfg. Co.,
534 So. 2d 1385 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (sufficient evidence for jury to find liability for failure to
warn of dangers of folding cafeteria tables weighing 315 pounds, a task plaintiff had been per-
forming for four years); Butz v. Werner, 438 N.W.2d 509 (N.D. 1989) (Plantiff was injured while
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individual cases of this type can probably best be explained by a judi-
cial attitude that the severely injured plaintiff should be compensated
even if this conclusion requires the adoption of some questionable fac-
tual premises. However, doctrinally, the most defensible explanation is
that the courts, behind the guise of failure to warn theory, have found
(or are willing to let the jury find) that the product was unreasonably
dangerous per se. Since warning of an obvious danger does not make
the product safer but only communicates information already known to
the user, to impose liability for failing to warn of obvious dangers is to
implicitly make a per se determination that the risk of the product out-
weighs the utility so as to justify requiring the manufacturer to bear
the cost of the risk.
HANDGUNS As PRODUCTS UNREASONABLY DANGEROUS PER SE
Handguns are perhaps the paradigmatic case of a product unrea-
sonably dangerous per se. As discussed below, they present tremendous
risk and have low utility. Accordingly, manufacturers should be strictly
liable for handgun inflicted deaths and injuries.
A. The Risk of Handguns
The risk to human life presented by handguns in terms of both the
severity of the risk and the probability of it occurring is almost unpar-
alleled. Of all the millions of products marketed in the United States,
only automobiles surpass handguns as a cause of unnatural death.3
Handguns kill 22,000 people each year and injure probably another
100,000. 3"
A telling contrast in how our society treats dangerous products can
be found by examining the case of lawn darts. In 1990, the Consumer
Product Safety Commission banned the sale of lawn darts based upon a
riding on a "Super Tube" being pulled behind a boat when the tube collided with a submerged
boat. Court held that the following dangers were not obvious: that the tube should not be pulled
above a certain speed, that the tube would accelerate and arc around corners, that the rider would
have no control over speed, and that the rider's vision would be impaired by the spray of the
tube.); Lewis v. Watling Ladder Co., 1986 WL 13960 (Tenn. App.) (unreported) (court reversed
summary judgment against plantiff in case where the ladder plaintiff was climbing slipped on wet
concrete; held genuine issue of fact existed with respect to adequacy of warning and defectiveness
of design.). Cf Campos v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 98 N.J. 198, 204, 485 A.2d 305, 310
(1984) ("A manufacturer is not automatically relieved of his duty to warn merely because the
danger is patent.").
33. Turley, supra note 3, at I.
34. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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finding that they "present an unreasonable risk of injury."3 The com-
mission arrived at this conclusion by applying a risk-utility analysis
quite similar to that which would be used to determine whether lawn
darts are an unreasonably dangerous product for purposes of strict
products liability.
The commission described the degree and nature of the risk as
being the "puncture of the skulls of children caused by lawn darts be-
ing used by children," 6 but mentioned that the total ban on lawn darts
would also eliminate other types of puncture wounds, lacerations, frac-
tures, and other injuries associated with the use of lawn darts.37 With
respect to the probability of the risk occurring, the commission esti-
mated that 670 lawn dart injuries occurred each year and found that
three children had been killed by lawn darts since 1970.8
This risk was seen as outweighing the utility of lawn darts: i.e., the
"recreational enjoyment" '39 they provided to the more than one million
consumers who purchased lawn darts annually.4 ° This conclusion was
bolstered by the commission's determination that substitute recrea-
tional enjoyment can be obtained from other products.4 ' The commis-
sion did not specify any particular type of recreational product which
would replace the enjoyment of launching steel tipped missiles across
the yard into a hoop. Apparently, the commission deemed recreational
products to be fungible. Horseshoes, for example, might be deemed an
adequate substitute for lawn darts.
A child being killed or seriously injured by a lawn dart puncturing
his skull is a scene almost too horrible to imagine, but certainly no
more horrible than a bullet penetrating the child's skull. Compare the
three children killed in twenty years by lawn darts to the 22,000 annual
handgun deaths, or even to the 365 children under age fifteen killed in
accidental handgun shootings every year.42 Compare the 670 lawn dart
injuries that the commission estimated were occurring each year to the
estimated 100,000 yearly handgun injuries. Then ask: what is wrong
with this picture?
35. 16 C.F.R. § 1306.4(a) (1990).
36. Id. at § 1306.4(b)(1).
37. Id. at § 1306.4(b)(2).
38. Id.
39. Id. at § 1306.4(d)
40. Id. at § 1306.4(c).
41. Id. at § 1306.4(d).




B. The Utility of Handguns
The answer lies in the exaggerated utility attached to handguns.
Our culture glorifies guns. They are elevated to the level of God by one
gun magazine, whose motto is: "For Americans who believe that God,
Guns & Guts Made US Great." 3 Guns are symbols of manhood, ma-
chismo, and power. They are inextricably identified with the courage,
ruggedness, and spirit of the American frontiersman.
Handguns have a cult of personality all their own. How many
times have we seen the movie or television actor tenderly pat his shoul-
der holster while making some reference to "my friend here" or "this
little baby"? Handguns are likely to be described by adjectives more
appropriate for a thoroughbred racing horse-sleek, pretty, awe-
some-than an ugly instrument designed principally for the purpose of
killing human beings.
Our romantic attraction to guns has honorable enough roots.
There was a time in this country when guns were a virtual necessity,
fulfilling vital needs for early pioneers and settlers. They put food on
the table and protected against attack from hostile natives. But that
was at least a century ago.
The utility of handguns in modern society is twofold: (1) they have
recreational utility in the form of hunting and target shooting; and (2)
they have the utility of self-protection. While I do not attach as much
importance to these utilities as do gun owners, I do not reject them as
insignificant. I appreciate that many people get substantial enjoyment
from hunting and target shooting, and also that many people believe
handguns afford them effective protection from criminals.
However, the utility of handguns is outweighed by the tremendous
risk they pose to society, particularly in light of the availability of a
substitute product which serves the same needs as a handgun: i.e., a
long gun.4 It is curious that all of the debate about risk-utility balanc-
ing with respect to handguns has ignored this obvious and critical ele-
43. J. ANDERSON. GUNS IN AMERICAN LIFE 4 (1984) (quoting the slogan of a gun magazine
called Pistolero). This book provides an interesting history of guns in American culture.
44. Long guns include shotguns and rifles. Under the theory of products unreasonably dan-
gerous per se, no showing is required as to the existence of a feasible alternative design. However,
if a court insisted upon such proof, I would argue that the availability of long guns satisfies that
requirement. While I am treating long guns as a substitute product in this article, it would not be
an unreasonable stretch to say that handguns and long guns are the same product with different
designs. They are manufactured for the identical purpose and operate in precisely the same way: a




ment of the equation. The availability of rifles and shotguns substan-
tially dilutes the utility of handguns. Long guns have almost the same
utility and present less risk because they are not easily concealable.
As to recreational use, long guns are obviously superior in their
utility for hunting because of their greater accuracy.' 5 This would seem
to make them superior for target shooting as well. Some sportsmen
might insist that they are fond of shooting at targets with rifles and
pistols, but this is where risk-utility balancing comes into play. The
marginal utility in the smidgeon of extra pleasure derived from plink-
ing a target with a handgun as opposed to a rifle is outweighed by the
greatly increased risk of handguns.
With regard to self-defense, it must first be noted that our faith in
guns as insurers of personal security is vastly out of proportion to real-
ity."6 Statistics show that the bumper sticker tribute to guns that "they
can take my gun when they pry it from my cold, dead fingers" is likely
to be self-fulfilling. The fact is that one who resists a criminal is eight
times more likely to be killed than one who does not.' 7 It is more prob-
able that the. handgun kept in the bedside table drawer for self-protec-
tion will be used to shoot a relative or acquaintance than to successfully
repel a criminal." More probable still is that the handgun will be sto-
len by a burglar, increasing the risk that it will be used against an
innocent person.' 9
However, accepting that in some cases a gun offers an effective
means of defending one's self, long guns fulfill that purpose almost as
well. If a homeowner feels more secure with a loaded gun in the house
while he sleeps, he should not feel any less secure because the weapon
is a long gun rather than a handgun. Indeed, I would think that con-
fronting a burglar with a 12-gauge shotgun would be much more intim-
idating and effective than a handgun. A large, visible weapon is more
45. Courts could follow the view taken by the Consumer Product Safety Commission with
respect to lawn darts and treat recreational products as fungible. Thus, hunting and target shoot-
ing might be replaced by, for example, bird watching and electronic video games. However, it is
not necessary to. adopt such an indifferent attitude toward recreational preference because of the
existence of a substitute product which tracks the recreational utility of handguns much more
closely.
46. I do not discount that this psychological security, though misplaced, has some degree of
utility.
47. Turley, supra note 3, at 60.
48. Turley, supra note 3, at 59. (citing study showing this is six times more likely than that.
the handgun will be used to defend against a burglar).




likely to deter the criminal, thereby eliminating the need to actually
use deadly force. If the use of such force becomes necessary, accuracy
counts. However, most people are not expert pistol shooters, particu-
larly in a dark house when they are under tremendous stress. With a
shotgun, simply firing the weapon in the general direction of the target
offers a reasonable chance of making contact. Moreover, shotgun pel-
lets which miss their target are not likely to penetrate the walls of a
dwelling and kill innocent persons outside.. That possibility exists as to
missed shots fired from a high-powered handgun.
I concede there are situations where a long gun, because it is not
small and easily concealable, will not be as effective as a handgun in
defending persons or property. A liquor store owner, for example, may
have a hard time withdrawing a long gun from beneath the counter to
defend against a robber. However, this is another instance where risk-
utility balancing dictates that long guns be viewed as an adequate sub-
stitute product. This marginal degree of enhanced utility of handguns
attributable to their small size is outweighed by the vastly greater risk
presented by handguns because of the same feature. 50
It is the easy concealability of handguns which makes them unrea-
sonably dangerous as compared with long guns. Roughly seventy-five
percent of all firearm homicides are committed with handguns. 51 Hand-
guns are what our children are carrying to school, not hunting rifles.
Handguns are what armed robbers use to gun down store clerks. Hand-
guns are what felons use to shoot police officers during routine traffic
stops. 52 While rifles and shotguns are very dangerous, they are not un-
50. The small size of handguns facilitates carrying them in public places, thus arguably
giving them significantly greater utility for protection in such places than long guns. Ignoring the
statistical evidence already cited showing it is usually more dangerous to resist an attacker than to
submit to the crime or run away, it is illegal in Arkansas, and I presume most other states, for
most private citizens to carry a handgun in a public place. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-120(a) (Supp.
1989) ("A person commits the offense of carrying a weapon if he possesses a handgun, knife or
club on or about his person, in a vehicle occupied by him, or otherwise readily available for use
with a purpose to employ it as a weapon against a person."). Thus, unless courts are prepared to
accept that an illegal act has legally cognizable social utility, this increased utility should be
disregarded. Moreover, this utility of handguns is reduced by the existence of other portable per-
sonal security products such as mace and electronic stun guns.
51. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES II (1989)
(9,013, or 76 percent, of the total 11,832 firearm murders in 1989 were committed with
handguns).
52. Seventy-six percent of the law enforcement officers killed with firearms from 1980-1989
were killed with handguns. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: LAW ENFORCE-
MENT OFFICERS KILLED AND ASSAULTED 13 (1989). Sixty-nine percent of all officers killed during
that period were killed with handguns. Id.
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reasonably dangerous because their greater utility for most legitimate
purposes outweighs their reduced risk as compared to handguns.53
To appreciate the distorted way society has until now applied risk-
utility balancing to handguns, it might be helpful to divorce the analy-
sis from a product so steeped in tradition and adoration and cast it
upon a different, hypothetical product. Suppose a manufacturer mar-
keted a drug as a remedy for morning sickness. I assume many women
who are or have been pregnant would attest that such a drug has sig-
nificant social utility. But suppose this particular drug, while effective
for combatting morning sickness, killed 22,000 women each year and
seriously injured 100,000 others. Assume also that the manufacturer
was aware of this risk at the time it manufactured and marketed the
drug. Finally, assume that substitute products existed which were al-
most as effective in relieving morning sickness. There can be no doubt
that: (a) the Food and Drug Administration would order the drug re-
moved from the market; and (b) the manufacturer would be held
strictly liable for manufacturing a defective product.
Some may argue that handguns have more social utility than a
morning sickness drug and, therefore, the comparison is not an apt one.
I disagree, but even accepting that as true, surely even the most ardent
handgun enthusiast could imagine some drug with greater social utility
than a handgun. Yet I submit that any drug-even a miracle cure for
cancer or AIDS-which killed 22,000 people each year and seriously
injured 100,000 others would be considered unreasonably dangerous,
particularly if a substitute medication existed which had almost the
same utility. This suggests that handguns have avoided being branded
as unreasonably dangerous products not so much as a result of the
faithful application of modern tort principles but because of a warped
social policy.
53. Handguns have much greater utility when used by law enforcement officers in the
course of their official duties. Courts could except manufacturers from liability when a law en-
forcement officer employs deadly force via a handgun on the basis that the utility of such use
outweighs the risk. In fact, it may be desirable as a matter of public policy to absolve handgun
manufacturers from liability in all cases where deadly force is legally employed. Thus, the burglar
who is shot entering a dwelling would not be permitted to recover against the manufacturer if the
use of deadly force was justified. This exception could be based upon the theory that the utility of
the handgun in that situation outweighed its risk or, alternatively, that tort remedies against a





A word about causation is warranted. Originally, courts permitted
recovery under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A only where the
plaintiff was injured while using the product for its "intended" purpose.
This precluded, for example, plaintiffs from suing automobile manufac-
turers for failing to design their products so as to protect passengers in
the event of a collision on the theory that collisions are not an intended
purpose of an automobile. In Larsen v. General Motors Corporation,5 "
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals extended the coverage of strict
liability to include foreseeable uses of the product. Since it is foresee-
able that automobiles will be involved in collisions, manufacturers owe
a duty to design their products accordingly.55 Most courts have fol-
lowed the Larsen lead. With respect to handguns, the argument is that
criminal and accidental shootings are not the intended uses of a hand-
gun. The Larsen anticipated use doctrine, however, disposes of this ar-
gument since there is no denying that such uses are foreseeable.
A more discrete causation argument is also advanced against strict
liability for handgun manufacturers in cases involving criminal attacks.
Traditional causation rules held that intervening criminal acts by third
persons supersede the original actor's conduct and, hence, liability. As
applied to handguns, this is the "guns don't kill people; people kill peo-
ple" argument."
The argument is unpersuasive. We could make the same kind of
argument as to many other products. "Ford Pintos don't kill people; the
people who run into the back of them do." "Industrial presses don't
maim people; the people who put their hands under them do." Modern
legal causation analysis focuses upon the foreseeability of the risk. Cer-
tainly, the overwhelming statistical evidence shows that one of the
prime foreseeable risks of a handgun is that it will be used to kill some-
one during a criminal attack. In negligence cases, many modern deci-
sions have held that intentional criminal acts do not supersede the neg-
ligence of the original actor where the criminal act was the very risk
created by the negligence.5 7
54. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
55. Id. at 502-03.
56. See Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Bloyd, 586 S.W.2d 19 (Ky. 1979) ("By their very nature
firearms are dangerous but do not kill people. It is the action of people in the use of firearms that
kill or injure people.").
57. See. e.g., Silva v. Showcase Cinemas Concessions of Dedham, Inc., 736 F.2d 810, 813
(lst Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 883 (1984) (defendant's failure to adequately patrol premises
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Interestingly, the leading case on this issue involving handguns is
an Arkansas case. In Franco v. Bunyard,8 the Arkansas Supreme
Court reversed a summary judgment entered in favor of a gun dealer
who sold a handgun to an escaped convict, Daniel Graham, who used
the gun to kill two persons and injure a third. The plaintiffs alleged the
gun dealer was negligent per se for failing to require Graham to com-
plete Form 4473, the federal Firearms Transaction Record. Completion
of the form, which contains identifying information about the pur-
chaser, is required by federal law.
The trial court held that Graham's criminal act was an unforesee-
able intervening cause which superseded the negligence of the gun
dealer. 9 The supreme court disagreed, holding that while the precise
manner in which the weapon was used may not have been foreseen,
"[ilt certainly cannot be said that his use of the gun in such a way as
to injure others was not foreseeable." 6 Therefore, the criminal act did
not supersede the negligence of the gun dealer as a legal cause of the
shootings.61-
TRUTH ABOUT CONSEQUENCES
I know already from speaking with Professor Oliver that he sees
my proposal for strict liability against handgun manufacturers as a
thinly veiled attempt to drive handgun manufacturers out of business,
thereby achieving maximum handgun control. I think I have made it
clear that my agenda regarding handguns is not a hidden one. I oppose
the policy in this country which favors ready access to this weapon of
destruction which, while it may provide solace and recreation for many
people, inflicts untold misery and suffering upon many others. Conse-
quently, it is true that I would not be disappointed if all the handgun
companies suddenly decided to devote their resources to making kinder,
gentler products.
However, shutting down the nation's handgun industry is not the
proximate cause of plaintiff's stabbing); Easley v. Apollo Detective Agency, 69 Ill. App. 3d 920,
387 N.E.2d 1241 (1979) (security agency liable for hiring guard with a violent record); Christen-
sen v. Epley, 36 Or. App. 535, 585 P.2d 416 (1978) (matron liable for police officer's death when
he was shot by juveniles who escaped from youth center).
58. 261 Ark. 144, 547 S.W.2d 91, cert denied, 434 U.S. 835 (1977).
59. Id. at 145, 547 S.W.2d at 92.
60. Id. at 147, 547 S.W.2d at 93.
61. The court attached significance to the fact that Graham would not have been able to
purchase the gun had the defendant complied with the federal regulations, since the regulations
require proof of identification and Graham had none. Id.
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inevitable consequence of imposing strict liability upon handgun manu-
facturers. Strict liability would not mean that manufacturers are pre-
cluded from making handguns. It would mean only that they, like all
other manufacturers of unreasonably dangerous products, must bear
the cost of injuries their products cause. The result would be that the
price of handguns would rise to reflect their true cost to society. Once
that price is reached, the free market would determine whether the
product is worth that cost to society.6 If manufacturers can continue to
make a profit by marketing handguns at this higher price, all is well
and good from a tort perspective. If not, then handguns will be re-
moved from the market.
Under present law, the price of handguns is heavily subsidized by
the victims of handgun violence. The estimated direct cost to the econ-
omy of the lost lives and resources devoted to treating handgun injuries
exceeds $20 billion annually."3 The manufacturers of handguns should
bear, or at least share, this cost. I feel quite confident that, given the
fervent devotion of gun enthusiasts, handguns would continue to sell at
even ten times their current prices. They undoubtedly would sell at a
slower rate, but that is not a bad result. There are already sixty to
seventy million handguns in this country.64 That seems to be about
fifty-nine to sixty-nine million too many.
Let me close with a proud parent story. My favorite fodder for
constructing classroom hypotheticals is, paradoxically, an Uzi machine
gun. Last summer, my daughter, then four years old, picked up the toy
Uzi which my Torts students gave me as a Christmas present and
pointed it at me. I admonished her never to point a gun at anyone. She
asked why and I told her that real guns kill and hurt people. Invoking
wisdom only a four-year-old could possess, she asked: "Then how come
they make them?" "Astute question," I said. Then, not wanting to
brainwash the child, I started to explain the perceived utility of fire-
arms, but she was not listening. She had gone back to watching Elmer
Fudd blow Bugs Bunny's head off with a shotgun.
62. Turley, supra note 3, at 46.
63. Id. at 43.
64. King, supra note 6, at 80, col. 4.
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